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BRIEF OF FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS AS
AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENT
INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici include academic financial economists
who teach and write about public securities
markets. 1 We file this brief in order to clarify the
areas of agreement and disagreement among
economists regarding the “Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis” (“ECMH”). Amici include:
Sanjai Bhagat, Provost Professor of Finance,
University of Colorado Leeds School of Business.
John
H.
Cochrane,
AQR
Capital
Management Distinguished Service Professor of
Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of
Business.
Darrell Duffie, Dean Witter Distinguished
Professor of Finance, Stanford University Graduate
School of Business.
B. Espen Eckbo, Tuck Centennial Chair in
Finance, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth
College.
Eugene Fama, Robert R. McCormick
Distinguished Service Professor of Finance,
University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
Professor Fama was a co-recipient of the 2013 Nobel
Prize in Economics for his work on the efficiency of
capital markets.
This brief has been filed with the written consent of
the parties, which filed blanket consents with the Clerk of
Court. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affirms that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor
did any person or entity, other than amici or their counsel,
make a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief.
1

S.P. Kothari, Gordon Y. Billard Professor of
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management.
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Andrew Lo, Charles E. and Susan T. Harris
Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Burton G. Malkiel, Chemical Bank
Chairman's Professor of Economics, Emeritus,
Princeton University.
Jeffry
M.
Netter,
Georgia
Bankers
Association Chair and Josiah Meigs Professor of
Finance, University of Georgia.
Thomas Philippon, Associate Professor of
Finance, New York University Leonard N. Stern
School of Business.
Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Finance,
University of Florida.
Richard Roll, Distinguished Professor of
Finance and Joel Fried Chair in Applied Finance,
University of California, Los Angeles.
David L. Yermack, Albert Fingerhut
Professor of Finance and Business Transformation,
New York University Leonard N. Stern School of
Business.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is widespread debate about market
efficiency among economists, and the signatories of
this brief include participants with varying positions
on that debate. It is critical, however, to be clear
about what issues are in dispute—and what issues
are not.
Economists disagree about whether
markets perfectly process information and how
quickly they do so; about whether prices reflect the
fundamental value of the underlying stock; about the
size and significance of “bubbles” and other pricing
anomalies in the market and the extent to which
non-informational factors affect prices; and about
whether it is possible to “beat the market” by
pursuing various investment strategies designed to
exploit pricing anomalies.
Such disagreements
existed when Basic was decided in 1988, and they
exist today.
But economists do not generally disagree
about whether market prices respond to new
material information. In particular, there is little
doubt that the stock price will increase reasonably
promptly after favorable news about a company is
released and decline after unfavorable news.
Our conclusion that prices generally move
reasonably promptly in the predicted direction in
response to unexpected material public information
(favorable or unfavorable) is perfectly consistent
with the view that there are sometimes anomalies in
the way markets process information and that
bubbles can exist.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Relationship Between The ECMH
And The Modest Proposition That Stock
Prices Move In Response To Material
Information.

Because economists disagree about the extent
to which securities markets are efficient, it is crucial
to be clear about the precise economic propositions at
issue. The ECMH entails a great deal more than the
modest proposition that markets typically respond
reasonably promptly to material information. That
much is generally viewed as common ground among
contemporary economists.
Eugene Fama’s seminal work in this area
distinguished among three different types of market
efficiency:
“Weak-form” efficiency means that
historical prices are not predictive of
future prices. Excess profits cannot be
earned using strategies based on
historical prices.
“Semi-strong form” efficiency implies
that all public information is reflected
in a stock’s current market price, and
that security prices adjust to new
publicly available information so that it
is impossible to earn excess returns by
trading on that information.
“Strong-form” efficiency implies that all
information in the market, whether
public or private, is accounted for in the
market price.
Investors cannot
consistently earn excess profits over a
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long period of time—even if they have
inside information. 2
Although all three models are sometimes
described as variations of the ECMH, references to
that hypothesis in the context of describing how
financial markets actually operate typically refer to
the “semi-strong” version (SSEMH). 3 The SSEMH
has been employed in a variety of different contexts
for a variety of different purposes. Some claims are
more controversial than others among economists.
The key point for present purposes is that
while the proposition that market prices respond
relatively promptly to material information about a
stock is true if the SSEMH is true, it does not
depend on the SSEMH being true. The SSEMH
entails that the market price instantly (or at least
very quickly) and fully incorporates all publicly
available information about the stock. It does not
tolerate even modest lags or other anomalies.
2 Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). See also
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Easterbrook, J.) (explaining the difference between these three
forms of market efficiency).

See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J.
Fin. 1575, 1575 (1991) (“I take the market efficiency hypothesis
to be the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all
available information . . . . A weaker and economically sensible
version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect
information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting
on the information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the
marginal cost.”). Standard finance textbooks provide similar
definitions. See, e.g., Richard Brealey, Stewart Myers &
Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 317-18 (10th
ed. 2011); Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffrey
Jaffe, Corporate Finance 430-31 (9th ed. 2010).
3
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Professional economists have debated for
decades the extent to which the securities markets
actually conform to the SSEMH. Excellent work has
been done on both sides of this debate. Indeed, the
Nobel Committee awarded last year’s prize in
Economics to both Eugene Fama, the “father” of the
efficient markets hypothesis, and Robert Shiller, one
of that hypothesis’s leading critics.
The SSEMH is based on two propositions: (1)
that most investors rationally invest on the basis of
available information; and (2) to the extent that
some investors act irrationally, their investments do
not affect prices because well-funded, highly
sophisticated investors can drive the prices back to
fundamentals in a process known as “arbitrage.”
Authors writing in the field of behavioral
economics disagree with both propositions. First,
they argue that investor irrationality is pervasive
rather than occasional or limited. Second, they argue
that because of the costs and risks of arbitrage—the
arbitrager must typically borrow money in
anticipation of the market correcting itself, which
may not happen quickly enough—arbitrage does not
always drive prices back to fundamentals. 4 As one
critic puts it, “real‐world arbitrage is risky and
therefore limited,” and its effectiveness depends “on
the availability of close substitutes for securities

4 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An
Introduction to Behavioral Finance 10-12 (2000) (noting
instances of investor irrationality); Daniel Kahneman & Mark
Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J. Portfolio Mgt. 52
(1998) (same); Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986)
(arguing that investors sometimes trade on “noise” rather than
information).
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whose price is potentially affected by noise trading.” 5
SSEMH proponents disagree about the magnitude of
the limits on arbitrage and argue that any anomalies
are quickly eliminated in the market. 6
The debate has played out through a series of
empirical studies. In the 1980s, for example, Robert
Shiller published stock market data that in his view
showed that stock market prices were considerably
more volatile than the SSEMH could account for. 7
Other scholars found that stock prices tended to
overreact to news—good news about a company
might cause the price to increase in the short term
and then fall in the long term as the market digested
the information more carefully. 8 Other findings
include superior performance of small companies
and predictability of returns according to market to
book ratios. 9 As Professor Shleifer points out, “this
evidence points to excess returns based on stale
information, in contrast to semi‐strong form market
efficiency.” 10 Defenders of the SSEMH, however,
5

Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, at 13.

See, e.g., id. at 4 (summarizing arguments by Milton
Friedman and Eugene Fama that “[t]he process of arbitrage
brings security prices in line with their fundamental values
even when some investors are not fully rational and their
demands are correlated, as long as securities have close
substitutes”).
6

7 See Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much
to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends? 71 Am.
Econ. Rev. 421 (1981).

See Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does
the Stock Market Overreact? 40 J. Fin. 793 (1985).
8

9

sources).
10

See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, at 18-19 (collecting
Id. at 18.
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have argued that the data can be explained on the
basis of hidden factors that are consistent with
Or they argue that the
investor rationality. 11
anomalies are trivial, and tend to disappear after
they are identified as rational investors take
advantage of them. 12
We have outlined these debates in some detail
because it is important to understand what is and is
not in dispute. Economists disagree about the
ability of arbitrage to compensate for investor
irrationality; the possibility of “beating the market”
through investment strategies based on either value
investing or exploiting irrational tendencies of
investors; the importance of non-information-based
factors to stock prices; and the speed and
completeness of the market’s ability to incorporate
material information about a stock.
about

But economists generally do not disagree
whether markets respond to material

11 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French,
Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies, 51 J. Fin.
55 (1996); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common
Risk Factors in the Returns on Bonds and Stocks, 33 J. Fin.
Econ. 3 (1993); see generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and
Economics 948 n.1 (Polinsky & Shavell, eds. 2007) (collecting
studies).

See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down
Wall Street 267-300 (10th ed. 2011); Ray Ball, The Global
Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What
Have We Learned? 21 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8, 15 (2009) (noting
that funds established to take advantage of behavioral
economics strategies have failed to outperform the market);
William Schwert, Anomalies and Market Efficiency, in
Handbook of Economics and Finance 940 (2003) (finding that
anomalies identified by critiques tend “to disappear, reverse, or
attenuate”).
12
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information. As Professor Shiller recently wrote in
explaining the extent of his disagreement with
Professor Fama, “Of course, prices reflect available
information.” 13
II.

Current
Disagreements
Among
Economists Over The Efficiency Of
Securities Markets Do Not Undermine
The Modest Assumption That Securities
Prices
Generally
Respond
To
Information Reasonably Promptly, In A
Predictable Direction.

Economists’ debates about the efficiency of
securities markets are interesting and important,
and they have significant implications for
government regulatory policy as well as strategies
that investors should pursue. But it is important to
be clear that economists generally agree that stock
prices respond to material information in a
predictable direction.
A.

Disagreement Among Economists
Concerning The Extent To Which
Stock Prices Reflect Underlying
Values Is Not The Same As A
Disagreement Over Whether Prices
Respond To Information.

The SSEMH, as stated by Professor Fama and
other proponents of efficient markets, does not
simply say that stock prices move in response to
information; rather, it holds that the market
Robert J. Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors, and
Agreeing to Disagree, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business/sharing-nobelhonors-and-agreeing-to-disagree.html?_r=0.
13
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completely digests all public information about the
stock, so that security prices fully reflect all
available information (or at least that prices reflect
information to the point where the marginal benefits
of acting on information do not exceed the marginal
costs of doing so) and that prices are a function only
of that relevant information.
Critics of SSEMH, on the other hand, insist
that this dynamic is not the whole story. Sometimes
markets
incorporate
information
slowly
or
incompletely, and sometimes stock prices display
volatility that cannot be explained by changes in the
available information about stocks. 14
The focus of these debates is on whether stock
prices reflect fundamental value—that is, the actual
value of the company—not on whether stock prices
can be counted on to move up or down in response to
information. That is why so much of the literature
criticizing the SSEMH refers to fundamental value
and fundamental efficiency. 15 That literature goes
far beyond the question of whether markets respond
in a predictable direction and reasonably promptly to
material information.

14 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets
Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 83, 84
(2003).

See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock
Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and
Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7, 20 (1994) (cited Petrs. Br.
16 for the proposition that “capital markets are not
fundamentally efficient”); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient
Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness? 54
Emory L. J. 843, 898 (2005) (cited Petrs. Br. 18 for the
proposition that, during the 1998-2001 technology bubble,
“stock prices [were] far away from fundamental values”).
15
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Economists
have
tested
the
SSEMH
empirically primarily by testing whether it is, in
fact, possible to earn excess returns through
particular trading strategy.
The results are
disputed; Andrei Schleifer and Lawrence Summers,
for example, have argued that it is possible to make
excess returns—that is, to “beat the market”—under
certain circumstances. 16
The critical point, however, is that this debate
about excess returns has little to do with the modest
assumption that prices move reasonably promptly in
a predictable direction in response to favorable or
unfavorable public information. The excess returns
debate goes to whether stock prices are
fundamentally accurate, not whether they move in
response to information.
Moreover, behavioral
economists do not dispute that market prices
generally remain the best available indicia of share
value, and their advice to investors generally
dovetails with that offered by proponents of the
SSEMH.
Professor Shiller, for example, has
acknowledged that it is “unlikely that the average
amateur investor can get rich quickly by trading in
the markets based on publicly available information
. . . . I personally believe this, and in my own
investing I have avoided trading too much, and have
a high level of skepticism about investing tips.” 17
The supporters and critics of the SSEMH also
debate the extent of any need for regulation of the
market. But there is a general consensus that
fraudulent
misrepresentations
harm
market
16 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers,
The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. Fin. Econ. Persp. 19
(Spring 1990).
17

Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors.
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participants and should not be condoned; the
SSEMH, after all, depends on the availability of
public and truthful information to drive prices. Nor
do skeptics of market efficiency dispute that
information affects prices—they simply assert that
other things affect prices, too. Because the market
responds to public statements, there is a substantial
public interest in ensuring that those statements are
truthful.
The economic proposition that prices move
reasonably promptly in a predictable direction in
response to favorable or unfavorable public
information does not require that markets be
anywhere near perfectly efficient.
Nor does it
require that one take any position on whether
particular trading strategies might “beat the
market” or whether government regulation is
appropriate.
B.

Economists Broadly Agree That
Stock Prices In Developed Markets
Generally
Do
Respond
To
Information.

The recognition of a relationship between
information and stock prices is considerably older
than the ECMH and related ideas developed by
Professor Fama and others in the 1960s. 18 William
O. Douglas, who was intimately involved in drafting
Courts and commentators have recognized that stock
markets respond to and reflect material information—including
false information—for at least two centuries. See, e.g., Rex v. De
Berenger, 3 M.& S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814); see also
Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing
with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 435, 456 (1984).
18
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the Securities Act, articulated this understanding in
1934:
[E]ven though an investor has neither
the time, money, nor intelligence to
assimilate the mass of information in
the registration statement, there will be
those who can and who will do so,
whenever there is a broad market. The
judgment of those experts will be
reflected in the market price. 19
Douglas’s formulation did not assert that the price
perfectly reflected all available information or the
stock’s fundamental value, and he did not deny that
other
factors,
including
various
forms
of
irrationality, might also affect prices. His point was
simply that stock prices respond to material public
information. Both proponents and critics of the
SSEMH can agree that Douglas was correct on this
point.
It is not accurate to say there is a “consensus”
among economists rejecting the SSEMH.
It is
accurate to say that the SSEMH is controversial, but
that controversy simply does not extend to rejecting
the relationship between information and price
movement. As one journalist who has written an
intellectual history of the economic debate
concluded, “[behavioral economists] still believe that
markets work pretty well and that trying to outguess
the collective wisdom of millions of investors is
usually futile.” 20
Most important, economists
19 William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 Yale
L.J. 522, 524 (1934).

Justin Fox, Is The Market Rational? No, say the
experts. But neither are you – so don’t go thinking you can
outsmart it, Fortune (Dec. 9, 2002), available at
20
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generally agree that material information—whether
truthful or fraudulent—will generally affect the
price of a stock and that the effect will be in a
predictable direction.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LEONARD BARRACK
BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
3300 Two Commerce Square
2001 Market Street
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lbarrack@barrack.com

ERNEST A. YOUNG
Counsel of Record
203 Strolling Way
Durham, NC 27707
(919) 360-7718
young@law.duke.edu

Counsel for Amici
February 5, 2014

http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/
12/09/333473/index.htm?; see also Justin Fox, The Myth of the
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